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Foreword from the Author

Dear Reader,

What you are about to read is a final project meant to incorporate ideas from my
undergraduate coursework with my interests in medicine and economics. Issues in health
care, especially insurance, fascinate me and I chose to use my Honors Capstone Project
as an opportunity to further my understanding of issues important to me as both a future
physician and businessman. The purpose of this paper is to practice critical and analytical
thinking skills by exploring some of the challenging issues surrounding American health
insurance and the Affordable Care Act while also gaining a deeper understanding of the
nuances of the health care system I will one day practice in.

I've made a conscientious effort to incorporate ideas and concepts from my
economics and business coursework into this paper to create a crossover between the
theoretical concepts discussed in the classroom and current real world events. The hope
is that the final product will not only act as a personal writing sample, but also be
informative and entertaining to the reader by conveying relevant and pertinent
information . Every section of this paper is meant to tell a story: each one with an
interesting history, a thorough analysis, and a forecasting of what is to come . Not all of
the stories will have a neat or happy ending, but nonetheless, these are the stories that
must be told.
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A Brief History of Health Care and Insurance in America

Health care in the United States is one of the most controversial and complex
issues facing Americans today. The advent of modern medicine has increased the average
lifespan and improved the quality of life for millions of Americans, while at the same time
also increasing overall costs. A little over 100 years ago, medicine was an underwhelming
field with few effective treatments and a myriad of pseudoscientific and oftentimes
dangerous procedures. In that day and age, medical care was often forgone and actual
medical expenses would not have cost more than $100 per year in inflation adjusted
dollars (Blumberg, 2009) . As medicine developed, treatments became more effective and
the technological advancements brought to light one of modern history's greatest
debates: the issue of allocating medical goods and services amongst the American
population .

Historically, medical care was distributed in a traditional free market manner with
clients paying directly for the medical services rendered by the physicians . Over the
course of the 20 th century, the idea of insurance coverage specifically for medical
expenses arose; this new concept drastically changed the way in which care was paid for.
Under this new system, individuals could pay small monthly risk premiums in order to
insulate themselves against unexpected and expensive medical bills in case disaster were
to strike (Blumberg, 2009). Savvy entrepreneurs were quick to discover the potential for
profit by providing this type of insurance and acting as a well compensated middleman
between health care providers and patients.
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As new insurance companies sprang into existence, individual health insurance
increasingly became the new standard, gradually replacing the traditional direct payment
model. In 1940, a mere 9% of people had health insurance, but by the 1960's about 70%
of the population was voluntarily enrolled in a health insurance plan (Blumberg, 2009).
Insurance had become ubiquitous and was not going anywhere. In fact, on July 30 th 1965,
the United States government introduced two programs that set in stone the health
insurance model and laid the foundations for the payment system we see today:
Medicare and Medicaid {CMS' Program, 2015).

Each program aimed to ensure adequate access to health insurance for specific
demographics, targeting both the elderly and senior citizen population as well as
America's poorest and most destitute. For the next half century, there were very few
monumental changes to the American system of health care up until the passage of the
Affordable Care Act in 2010 under President Barack Obama and a Democratic Party
controlled congress {CMS' Program, 2015) . The Affordable Care Act marked the next
pronounced shift in medicine and drastically changed health care in ways that had not
been seen since the introduction of Medicare and Medicaid. These changes were not just
limited to health insurance as the new law produced additional effects that have rippled
through many aspects of American society.

The purpose of the Affordable Care Act was to increase access to care for all
American citizens, while reducing overall costs and improving treatment outcomes. When
the health care law was passed, it contained no shortage of text, much of which legislated
areas outside of health insurance by mandating new taxes, creating requirements for
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businesses, and adding clauses that benefited special interests. The cumulative effects of
the law were profound ; individuals were now required by law to purchase insurance, new
insurance exchanges and subsidies were created, and physicians saw changes that had a
significant effect on the way they practiced medicine (ObamaCare Summary, n.d .).

The effects of the Affordable Care Act have just started to emerge over the course
of the past several years as the roll out and implementation of the law has slowly come to
fruition. With such a new and complex overhaul to the American health care system,
many areas of study have materialized that are ripe for analysis. This paper will examine
before and after snapshots in order to see what changed after the passage of the
Affordable Care Act and why these changes happened. The new health care law is not
simply all good or all bad , but rather has many positive and negative aspects that affect
different groups in different ways; every part of the law has a profound impact on
American society, creating both winners and losers. Examining the past literature as well
as current events, this paper will dissect some macro issues and sections of the Affordable
Care Act in order to gain a detailed understanding of who these winners and losers are,
why they were affected in the way they were, and what changes could be made to create
a more efficient and cost effective health care system.

R y an

17

The Role of True Insurance

As health insurance became increasingly popular over time, many economists
sought to analyze ways to make the system as efficient as possible. This process of analysis
has often been termed "the anatomy of health insurance" and is not a simple process. To
complicate matters further, there is no single best solution that maximizes all areas of
health insurance. Instead, health insurance is viewed as "a challenging exercise in the
second best" because "on each of a variety of dimensions, goals must be traded off
against each another, since first principles are in conflict" (Cutler, 2000). Many of these
multifactorial issues are addressed in David Cutler's chapter, The Anatomy of Health
Insurance, but the fundamental problem that must be discussed here is the tradeoff
between risk spreading and maintaining appropriate incentives.

One of the most basic tenets of any insurance is that it must be a financially losing
proposition for the average enrollee. The expected value of payouts and expenses per
person for the company must be lower than the expected revenue the company receives
from each enrollee . Simple math and basic economic principles show that if variable
expenditures exceed revenue, a company will choose not to stay in business. Since this
situation would lead to a lack of insurance providers, it is safe to say that companies would
not operate if medical insurance was not profitable to the business and a losing
proposition for the average consumer.

This begs the question as to why anyone would purchase any type of insurance if
on average it is likely to cost more money than going uninsured. Simply put, there has to
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be some sort of non-financial benefit from having insurance that is worth paying extra
for. That benefit is the peace of mind and protection from disaster or catastrophe.
Whether it is medical, home, life, or any other type of insurance, consumers want to
purchase insurance to protect themselves from situations by which random chance could
leave the customer in financial ruin or a difficult situation. In a true health insurance
market, this would be the main reason to purchase insurance. However, in the convoluted
health care system we have today, there are also other reasons and benefits to
purchasing insurance that cannot be ignored, such as: benefitting from discounted rates
(What Are, 2012), legal mandates and fines (Obamacare Individual, n.d.), and other
complicated factors .
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Comprehensive versus Catastrophic Insurance

The ideological goal of insurance is simply to protect against catastrophe for any
one individual by pooling risk. For most people, the amount paid through premiums will
far outweigh any benefits in the future . However, the additional cost provides peace of
mind that the customer will be insulated in the case of a disaster. The goal of insurance
should not be to pay for routine costs as such a system would lead to higher premiums
and even more inefficiencies. Unfortunately, when it comes to health insurance those
ends seem to be the norm. Efficient and worthwhile insurance systems have very low
financial inputs and pay out only in cases of disaster or large unexpected events.

Before explaining why low cost plans are ideal for insurance optimization, it is
important to first classify insurances based on premiums and coverage . I will call any
insurance that has very low fixed costs, low subsidization of health care costs, and a high
deductible and maximum out of pocket limit, a catastrophic plan or true insurance. The
converse, a plan with high fixed costs, high subsidization of care, and a lower deductible
will be called a comprehensive plan. In reality plans can and do range anywhere between
the two extremes with unique and different options for premiums, coinsurance,
deductibles, and other important metrics.

The system we have today is heavily biased towards comprehensive plans which
create economic inefficiencies by altering and distorting the demand curve for health care
services. This in turn leads to overconsumption and rendering of elective services that
may be unnecessary or not worth the cost. To explain why insurance, specifically those
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with more comprehensive characteristics, raises costs and reduces the value to the
consumer, I will use a thought experiment from the economist Johnathan Cochran who
has studied the Affordable Care and health insurance in depth.

We will imagine that a patient has been suffering from lower back pain for several
months. Upon going to the physician's office, the patient has the opportunity to have an
MRI: a diagnostic imaging test that has the potential to reveal the etiology of the back
pain. This creates the question of whether or not the patient should choose to undergo
the MRI or not. The answer is not simply yes or no but instead depends on how much the
individual patient values the MRI at that time. If the cost is $1000, the patient should
undergo the MRI if he or she feels that the possibility of resolving the pa in is worth the
cost of the test. Cochran presents a litmus test in which the patient would be asked if he
or she would rather consume the MRI or forgo the MRI and receive a check for $1000. If
the patient would choose the money, then the decision under normal circumstances
should be to not receive the MRI because the $1000 is worth more than a possible back
pain diagnosis (Cochrane, 2013).

The brilliance of this example is that it shows how health care should work in an
efficient market and allows for an easy means to demonstrate how insurance distorts the
market. Let us pretend the patient had comprehensive insurance; the patient may now
have the option of paying a partial cost of $200, or potentially no cost at all for the MRI if
he or she has met the plan 's deductible. The MRI still costs the health care system $1000
but the price to the consumer is now a fraction of the original cost . A situation like this is
bound to affect the demand for health services .

Ry a n

I 11

The law of demand states that when price decreases, the quantity demanded
increases (Henderson, 2008), which leads us to the conclusion that more people would
undergo the MRI when enrolled in a comprehensive insurance plan than when uninsured
and faced with the true cost. With catastrophic insurance, the patient is unlikely to have
much if any subsidization and will be less likely to undergo the procedure unless it is truly
necessary or worth the price. In a population with only catastrophic insurance, fewer
MRl's will be purchased at any price than in a system with only comprehensive insurance.

The end result of a comprehensive health insurance system is that people will pay
more and use more services, regardless of whether or not they are necessary or valuable.
The insurance system we see now almost entirely removes traditional supply and demand
when it comes to health care services. If a consumers uses little or no service, he or she
will still spend a large amount each year due to expensive premiums. Those who utilize
large amounts of care each year end up paying a much smaller marginal cost for the care
than actual dollar amount. Once deductibles are met and maximum out of pocket limits
are hit, health care services end up having a marginal cost of zero since the consumer
pays no additional financial costs for any additional treatment. This creates a perilous
situation where overuse becomes commonplace .

A more straightforward, but fictitious, example would be forcing every citizen to
pay $100 a month for the right to buy groceries at half price from Walmart. Because all
groceries are subsidized, individuals will buy many more groceries, and sometimes even
more expensive ones, than they would if they went to a non-subsidized grocery store. We
can extend the example further by saying that once a person buys $500 worth of groceries
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each month, any additional grocery is sold free of charge. This is analogous to hitting the
maximum out of pocket limit on a health insurance plan. We can see once again that this
method certainly is not efficient in allocating groceries to the American population, and
the same idea applies to health insurance.

Using the example of the

MRI, one may mistakenly believe that the

comprehensive insurance enrollee benefitted in the long run by paying a mere $200 for a
$1000 procedure. However, before the visit we must remember that the consumer had
paid large sums for premiums (likely several hundred dollars each month) that likely
outweighed the small savings of $800, made worse by the potential that it was a service
he or she may not have even needed or was worth the cost. Even if an individual was able
to profit in the short run, as more and more people receive similar subsidized services the
costs increase for the insurance companies and premiums increase alongside costs to
keep the expected value of expenses lower than the expected value of the premiums. Put
simply, the increased costs of care are shifted right back to the consumers .

At the end of the day, although a few individual cases can save money in the long
run through insurance, the average consumer can never profit from holding insurance.
The nature of insurance is a system in which the vast majority of individuals lose out by
overpaying and a few individuals benefit from underpaying for coverage. In the end
though, even the losers benefit due to the utility that comes from having the safety net.
The system works because the small additional cost to most consumers is worth the
benefit of the peace of mind and financial stability from protection against catastrophe .
True insurance has these benefits; think of a home insurance policy that covers the cost
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of the house should it be partially or completely destroyed. The insurance would not pay
anything towards routine maintenance, replacing flooring, or any of the plethora of costs
associated with owning a house. These normal costs are paid directly by the consumer
with little distortion of value or demand and the homeowner pays a small amount in
monthly premiums. The health insurance we see today saps much of the additional
consumer surplus through higher than necessary costs and inefficiencies.
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The Affordable Care Act and the Continuation of Past Mistakes

Looking back on the past forty to fifty years there has been a transformation from
true or catastrophic insurance plans to comprehensive ones, even before the passage of
the Affordable Care Act . Over that same time there has been an alarmingly high real,
meaning adjusted for inflation, increase in the amount of money spent on health
expenditures per person (see figures 1 and 2 in appendix). During the period from 1999
to 2013, the average premium went up by 196% while inflation only increased by 40%
(see figure 3 in appendix) . While the correlation between more expensive plans and total
health expenditures per person may not be entirely causal, as there could be other factors
contributing to increasing costs, the link between the two factors provides support for
the assertion that comprehensive plans with higher fixed costs distort the demand for
health care and lead to increasing amounts of both necessary and unnecessary care.

While one might assume that a law meant to minimize health care costs and
reduce unnecessary services would encourage people to purchase catastrophic
insurance, the Affordable Care Act actually does the exact opposite. The new health care
law actually makes catastrophic plans incredibly difficult to purchase and mandates that
all plans have minimum essential coverage. Under the new law, catastrophic plans are
not sold by the health care exchanges, meaning there are no subsidies available for those
purchasing the plans (Catastrophic Health, n.d).

In addition, individuals can only purchase these catastrophic plans if they are
under 30 or qualify for a hardship exemption. This requirement adds yet another level of
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effort and complexity for individuals trying to find a good plan and the extra work acts as
a deterrent for catastrophic plans. To make matters worse, these plans are not even true
catastrophic plans as they have maximum out of pocket costs of no more than $6,600 for
a single person or $13,200 for a family per year, and the plans include other guaranteed
benefits rolled into the price (Catastrophic Health, n.d.). These limits prevent additional
plans with lower premiums and higher maximum out of pocket costs from existing, which
could be of benefit to high income earners only looking for protection from larger medical
expenses .

These changes under the Affordable Care Act have taken one the most significant
issues facing health care over the past 40 years, the increasingly price insensitive health
care market, and exacerbated the problem by moving American health care even further
down that defunct path . Consumers by and large cannot purchase the types of plans most
beneficial for themselves and instead face a mandate to purchase expensive insurance
with potentially unnecessary benefits. The cancellations and removals of catastrophic
plans from the market, coupled with the mandate to purchase plans with minimal
essential coverage, are likely to lead to increased costs both overall and per person in
America.

The ideal solution to fix this aspect of the Affordable Care Act is to create
mechanisms that incentivize companies to provide low cost plans where the cost of care
is felt by consumers at the point of consumption. Assuming the rest of the law remained
ceteris paribus, the exchanges and subsidies should be altered to only sell and subsidize
variants of catastrophic insurance. As more consumers would purchase catastrophic
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plans, the level of overall health care expenditures would likely decrease and consumers
would save money on elective care they did not necessarily need. The trend of the last 40
years would be reversed and the Affordable Care Act would live up to its name and
intention of providing less expensive health care .

Furthermore, the government could take steps to legislate programs that
incentivize health savings. In order to effectively prepare for minor or routine expenses,
individuals would need to be able to have some of the money that they saved by avoiding
expensive premiums on hand . The United States already has some tax deferred pools such
as flexible spending accounts (FSA) and health savings accounts (HSA) . Under the revised
system FSAs, HSAs, and other savings programs can be expanded to allow individuals to
save more each year and be able to continuously roll over savings as desired . With these
adjustments to the Affordable Care Act, the American health care system could make
leaps and bounds towards providing more cost effective and efficient care .
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Changes Based on Pre-existing Conditions

One of the most notable changes to the American health care system under the
Affordable Care Act was the way in which insurance companies dealt with patients that
had pre-existing conditions. Before the health care law was passed, insurance companies
could tailor their decision on whether to provide coverage to patients by looking at the
customer's past medical history. If a patient had a history of chronic or expensive
illnesses, the insurance companies had the right to charge much higher premiums or even
outright deny coverage to these individuals.

A congressional investigation into four of the nation's largest health care
insurance companies from 2007 to 2009 found that approximately 1 in 7 individuals were
denied health insurance over this time period due to having a pre-existing condition. A
list of over 400 conditions or diagnoses were compiled through the congressional hearing,
all of which had been used to screen clients seeking health insurance. The data uncovered
by the investigation also pointed to an increasing number of health insurance rejections
each year, even after accounting for growth in overall applications (Potter, 2015).

The old health care system described above has changed drastically due to the
passage of the Affordable Care Act, and the winners, losers, and incentives have been
altered. The Affordable Care Act specifically forbade insurance companies from denying
coverage to any individual regardless of any medical condition he or she may have had in
the past or was currently facing. Moreover, the law also removed the ability of insurance
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companies to charge different prices for any one plan based on the health of the
consumer (Obamacare Pre-existing, n.d.).

In determining the premium prices that customers will pay, insurance companies
can look at no more than three risk factors: age of client, geographical location, and use
oftobacco (How Health, n.d.) . Before, companies could look at any number of factors and
tailor a plan's cost based on these traits; now, companies are blind to many important
differences and can only differentiate between customers based on the aforementioned
three criteria. Due to the fact that insurance companies lack the ability to charge different
prices based on the cost of individual clients, healthy and sick clients at any age level or
location are charged the same amount for health insurance. This means that a 50 year
old, healthy female, living in one geographical area must pay the same amount as a 50
year old male with a history of severe alcoholism, obesity, and mental health disorders in
the same area if she wishes to receive the same coverage.

Winners and Losers:

Under the old system, the effect of the insurance application process had little
impact on those with insurance through their employers, but was devastating to those
that were laid off or needed to purchase health insurance individually from these
companies. Those citizens who were employed benefitted as most group policies that
employers provided did not discriminate based on health status and were also subsidized
through the employer, reducing the nominal price that employees paid for premiums.
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However, individuals who had lost their employer provided insurance, those wanting to
switch carriers, and people trying to buy insurance for the first time all could face
difficulties in finding affordable coverage or oftentimes even coverage at all (Potter,

2015).

Under the old health care system that allowed denial of coverage, healthy
individuals heavily benefitted from the ability of insurance companies to deny sick
individuals service. If an insurance company selectively provided coverage to a mainly
healthy and low risk population, the total costs to that insurance company would be much
lower overall when compared to a similar company with a sicker customer base that is
more representative of the general population. These lower operating costs could in turn
allow some of the savings to be passed on to existing customers in the form of lower
monthly premiums and fewer out of pocket expenses . For those that were healthy when
they bought insurance or lacked a history of expensive illness, this provided a relatively
affordable option that would allow for coverage should an unexpected illness or medical
emergency arise.

Insurance companies could also benefit under the old system by reducing the
variability and risk in their customer pool by screening out those applicants with
expensive pre-existing conditions. By insuring a relatively higher number of healthy
individuals, these companies could minimize the threat of too many patients getting sick
at the same time. The chance that too many people in an unhealthy pool get sick at the
same time could negatively affect the company's ability to remain profitable in the short
term, even if costs were to eventually even out in the long run.
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Although healthy individuals and insurance companies benefitted from these
laws, there was also a significant population that lost out. Those with chronic conditions,
patients with the inability to afford health care, and those who had been laid off had very
limited access to affordable insurance, and sometimes even lacked access to any coverage
at all. This population was at an inherent loss under the old system, and much of the
Affordable Care Act was designed in order to benefit these individuals by spreading costs
onto healthier less expensive clients.

The winners and losers in the post Affordable Care Act system that disallows
discrimination based on health history are almost entirely opposite that of the old system.
Most notably, this means that the new premiums faced by healthy individuals will
increase, while those paid by the less healthy individuals will decrease substantially. While
the winners and losers for customers and patients end up reversed, the effects on the
insurance companies due to these changes are far more complex and will be left
ambiguous. For now, we will only surmise that healthy clients were hurt by this change,
and those with pre-existing, chronic, or expensive conditions benefited.

In fact, a recent report released at the end of March 2016, found that in the past
two years, those enrolled in Affordable Care Act exchanges tended to be less healthy and
incurred significantly greater costs than their counterparts with employer sponsored
coverage. The report showed that individuals enrolled by the exchange had increased
rates of heart disease, diabetes, and depression, while also costing insurance companies
22% more on average to insure (Sun, 2016). Not only are Affordable Care Act enrollees
costing the health care system more, but they are paying less in premiums due to the
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subsidies, thus increasing the bill that must be picked up by other individuals. The results
of this report provide a relevant real world example supporting the predictions of winners
and losers discussed above.

Incentives for Work and Health:

The ban on price discrimination due to pre-existing conditions lessened two very
important incentives: the incentive to maintain good health and the incentive to remain
employed. The old system provided an incentive for those that were underemployed or
unemployed to gain work in an environment that provided insurance, and also created
an incentive for those already employed to stay at their current place of employment.
The incentive to find work would be largely positive as it is likely to increase workforce
participation by providing another pull factor to entering the job market. The latter
incentive, the incentive to stay at one company, could have both positive and negative
effects.

The positive effects would come from decreased employee turnover which would
increase the efficiency of companies and reduce frictional costs associated with
employers finding replacement workers. The current employees, who may have left
otherwise, could also benefit by avoiding a period of joblessness and not having to go
through the process of finding new work. There may also be some level of negative effect
on employee satisfaction as some workers may have felt pressured to stay with their
current employer despite potentially not enjoying the work or dealing with an abusive or
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toxic work environment. Without further economic analysis there is no way to tell
whether the positive or negative effects would dominate, however the understanding of
why these effects exist is sufficient for the scope of this paper.

The pre-Affordable Care Act health care system also created a second and even
more important incentive: the financial incentive to maintain good health . In medicine,
costly treatments contain both preventable and random components. Figuring out the
exact breakdown of preventable and random diseases is a complex issue in and of itself
and is not the focus of this paper. However, it is safe to assume that both random and
preventable illnesses are significant health care expenditures, meaning a reduction in
either could lead to real health care savings.

Many medical conditions such as cardiovascular diseases and obesity related
illnesses can be significantly reduced by lifestyle decisions such as exercising regularly,
maintaining a healthy diet, and avoiding harmful activities like smoking or using illicit
drugs. For example, The Center for Disease Control and Prevention estimates that one in
three deaths in America are attributable to heart disease and stroke, of which over
200,000 are estimated to be preventable by changes in lifestyle (Preventable Deaths,
2013).

As a country that already struggles with a high prevalence of preventable diseases
like diabetes and obesity, removing this incentive entirely is largely detrimental. In fact,
the United States currently houses roughly 13% of the world's obese individuals, despite
America making up only a mere 5% of the world's population (Murray, n.d.). The
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economic effects of this one issue are enormous, with estimates that the cost to treat
obesity related illnesses ranges between $147 and $210 billion per year. In addition, the
costs to employers that hire obese workers has been estimated at around $4.3 billion per
year, mostly attributed to job absenteeism, which divides out to around $505 per obese
worker per year (The Healthcare, n.d.) .

These simple statistics are just a few of the many that paint a picture of the dire
need to promote proper health and the avoidance of preventable diseases in America.
With the goals of cutting costs and creating a healthier population , some measure needs
to remain that incentivizes health maintenance if the United States hopes to reduce how
much it spends on health care. The old system that allowed companies to screen health
records created a real financial incentive for many people to stay healthy in order to
receive less expensive coverage. Price discrimination made living an unhealthy lifestyle
not just medically dangerous, but also expensive.

With the exception of one condition, tobacco use, the incentive to maintain
personal health based on financial effects has been almost entirely removed under the
Affordable Care Act . Besides age and location, insurance companies are currently only
allowed to discriminate on price based on the client' s smoking history, which provides a
very real financial incentive for individuals to stop smoking. A person can face a premium
penalty of up to one and a half times the going rate for smoking (How Health, n.d .), which
considering the expense of health insurance, can end up being a significant extra cost.
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How can the United States balance a system that guarantees the ability to
purchase health insurance while still promoting healthier lifestyles? If the ban on
discriminating based on health conditions was upheld, an addendum could be made
allowing insurance companies to employ dynamic pricing for other lifestyle health risks,
for example obesity. The exact criteria selected should be left up to committees of
economists, physicians, and public health professionals, who can use their collective
expertise to properly determine what factors are reasonable and effective to reduce
costs .

The details and execution of such a plan would be complicated as even
professionals have differing opinions on the issues. Some issues like smoking may be easy
to reach consensus on, while other issues like Type II Diabetes or even driving a car may
be more controversial. Although the process proposed here is less than perfect, it is a step
in the right direction by placing professionals in charge of this task rather than politicians
and special interest groups. By adding consideration of these additional health factors in
setting prices, the financial incentive to maintain good health can once again play a role
in reducing health care expenditures on preventable disease.

The solution proposed above helps mitigate many of the issues from both before
and after the passage of the Affordable Care Act. The prior issue of the inability to
purchase insurance is still resolved through the upheld ban on denying customers based
on pre-existing conditions, while the incentive to live a healthy lifestyle, which, except for
tobacco use, was removed under the Affordable Care Act, is restored by allowing more
expensive premiums for individuals choosing to engage in unhealthy behaviors. All of this
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is accomplished under the framework of promoting better overall health and reducing
health care costs.

The Individual Mandate:

In order for the Affordable Care Act to ban price discrimination based on preexisting conditions in a manner that allowed the insurance providers to remain solvent,
the new law added two other provisions: the individual mandate and the open enrollment
period . The individual mandate is a legal requirement forcing all citizens to purchase an
insurance policy or face increasingly costly financial penalties (Obamacare Individual, n.d).
Without the personal mandate, healthy individuals could simply not purchase insurance
until absolutely necessary, and companies would primarily insure only very sick clients .
Under a system like that, insurance companies could no longer stay in business as only
sick individuals would enroll and both expenses for companies and premiums for
consumers would increase exponentially.

The morality and ethicality of forcing individuals to carry insurance is ambiguous
and highly debated. One of the most common complaints about the individual mandate
is that it violates the liberty of American citizens by legally requiring them to buy a product
regardless of whether they desire to do so. In fact, the Supreme Court Case National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, challenged the individual mandate on
essentially those grounds, but on June 28 th 2012 the Supreme Court ruled 5-4 that the
individual mandate was considered a tax and thus legal (Obamacare Individual, n.d).
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While this decision allowed the Affordable Care Act to remain in effect, it did not assuage
the concerns of those who opposed the mandate based on the idea of personal freedom.

One of the potential benefits that could come from having an individual mandate
is that a mandate forces some level of financial responsibility on individuals for the costs
of their treatments. Currently, regardless of ability to pay most hospitals must provide
emergency medical treatment under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act (EMTALA). Although EMTALA is incredibly complex, the following quote summarizes
the most important provision:
"Any patient who 'comes to the emergency department' requesting 'examination
or treatment for a medical condition' must be provided with 'an appropriate
medical screening examination' to determine if he is suffering from an 'emergency
medical condition' . If he is, then the hospital is obligated to either provide him
with treatment until he is stable or to transfer him to another hospital in
conformance with the statute's directives" (Fosmire, 2009).
Due to EMTALA many medical costs are never paid and are either expunged through
bankruptcy, written off as losses, or simply never collected on. These costs end up falling
on a variety of parties including the hospital, tax payers, the government, and others. In
2012, there was $45.6 billion of uncompensated care, making up approximately 6.1% of
hospital expenses (Healthcare Collection, n.d.) . These are enormous costs that must be
made up by those who are not defaulting on health care bills.
EMTALA makes health insurance different from any other class of insurance such
as collision, house, or life, because it eliminates some of the risk of going uninsured. If a
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woman forgoes collision insurance on her new car and crashes it, only she is responsible
for the loss of her car and no one else will be buying her a new one. Few people would
make the argument that someone else should buy her a new car after she made the risky
choice to drive uninsured, as she must now face the consequences of her decision.
However, in medicine if a man chooses to go uninsured and needs an emergency
surgery or expensive treatment, the decisions often involve life or death outcomes. While
most people would let the woman suffer the loss of her car, few would be okay with
letting the man die because he made the risky choice to go uninsured. In a situation like
this, America has created a society where people are given the freedom to make any
decision they want, while leaving the rest of society on the hook for the costs of those
poor decisions every time things go wrong.
This creates a no win situation in which a society either allows individuals to die
due to their poor decision making (ex. not having some sort of insurance) or removes
some of the negative financial consequences for taking the risk of going uninsured.
Through EMTALA, America decided on the second option and created a loophole where
individuals can consume health care services without an enforcement mechanism to
collect on the costs. For someone with a low net worth, this creates an opportunity to pay
out of pocket for inexpensive and routine treatments, yet still have access to care and
erasable debt if disaster should strike.
Due to the fact that medical debt is dischargeable through bankruptcy, those that
are uninsured actually do have protection against catastrophic medical expenses, without
ever paying a premium. This situation highlights an example of what I will refer to
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hereafter as pseudo insurance: which I define as any instance in which an individual gains
protections similar to those of a person who is insured without actually paying the costs
to be insured.
The individual mandate takes a step to close this loophole by forcing everyone to
purchase insurance. If everyone has to pay in via taxes or premiums, free riders can no
longer not pay into the system while still reaping services if emergencies arise. However,
the individual mandate is actually incredibly ineffective in accomplishing this goal. There
are numerous exemption for individuals who meet a broad set of criteria, which still
allows many individuals to avoid purchasing health insurance and not pay the individual
mandate tax. The CBO estimated that in 2016 roughly 90% of the approximately 30 million
people without health insurance avoided paying the penalty due to the numerous
exemptions (Obamacare Individual, n.d) . This means that the individual mandate did little
to close the pseudo insurance loophole and instead mainly functions by forcing the
subsidization of the Affordable Care Act exchanges by healthy individuals.

The Open-Enrollment Period:

Now that we understand why the individual mandate was necessary for the ban
on pre-existing conditions, we can discuss the other necessary clause : the open
enrollment period. One major change under the Affordable Care Act, that directly ties
into the mandate and the ban on price discrimination, is the creation of enrollment
windows in which patients have the ability to sign up for these guaranteed coverage plans
regardless of pre-existing conditions. With just the mandate, individuals could pay the
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annual penalties, which oftentimes are much less expensive than insuring an entire
family, and then sign up for guaranteed coverage only when sick. The open-enrollment
period is the third part of Affordable Care Act along with the individual mandate and ban
on price discrimination that are necessary for the law to stay afloat.

During the open-enrollment periods, individuals can purchase subsidized,
nondiscriminatory health insurance from the Affordable Care Act health insurance
exchanges in a window of approximately three months (Norris, 2016). This period of time
is a necessity for insurance companies to be able to remain in business since they can no
longer turn away any clients. Under the old system, there was an incentive for everyone
to be covered at all times, even when healthy, because a single uninsured catastrophe or
disease could leave an individual stranded and unable to purchase affordable insurance
after the incident. The open enrollment period is necessary in order to keep this old
incentive in place under the new health care law.

For an individual that does not wish to purchase continuous health insurance, a
longer enrollment period makes going uninsured much less financially risky compared to
a shorter enrollment period, thus providing a sort of pseudo insurance. During the
enrollment period, those customers who wish to remain uninsured have the ability to
purchase insurance near instantaneously, which provides a safety net should disaster
strike during that time . At the far extreme of a 12 month enrollment period, there would
be almost no incentive to purchase insurance in advance, as customers would have the
guaranteed option to purchase insurance at any time, including immediately after a
diagnosis with a chronic illness . This would create a loophole where an individual could
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choose to never purchase insurance all the way up until the point that he or she needed
expensive treatment, and then enroll. The length of time for the enrollment period will
directly correlate with how big or small the loophole is at any point in time.

The three month window acts as a somewhat effective way to prevent this sort of
abuse as it forces individuals to purchase insurance during this time span, or else face a
lack of guaranteed care for the next nine months. A simple analysis, as shown above,
reveals that a shorter enrollment window provides a larger incentive to purchase
coverage than a longer enrollment window. The ideal length of an enrollment period may
be hard to pinpoint, but the conditions under which this would happen can probably be
identified.

In order to maximize the incentive to enroll, it would make sense to provide the
shortest window possible in which the vast majority of individuals would have the
appropriate amount of time to shop for and purchase insurance. With each day of
additional time, individuals who would not normally purchase health insurance are able
to have an extra period with pseudo insurance . How much exactly the current three
month period should be curtailed is a matter for a more thorough economic analysis, but
it is likely that this period lies on the longer end of what is optimal.

In fact, this issue is currently under review and there are plans to shorten the
enrollment window in the near future. The current three month window seems to be too
long and has led to increasing costs. In order to remedy this problem the open enrollment
window is set to be halved to approximately six weeks beginning in 2019 (Norris, 2016).
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This is most certainly a step in the right direction, and slowly starts to close a very obvious
loophole created by the Affordable Care Act.

In

addition

to

open-enrollment

periods,

qualifying

events

and

unique

circumstances can allow special enrollment periods in which individuals can enroll in
exchanges outside of the normal window. The criteria for allowing special enrollments
are also under review and measures to reform the system begin in 2016 starting with
individuals needing to require proof of an eligible event in order to qualify for a special
enrollment period (Norris, 2016). Why these changes are happening six years after the
passage of the law is another issue entirely, but it is better that these loopholes are being
closed now rather than never.
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The Price Tag on the Affordable Care Act and where the Money Goes

Another consideration in the analysis of the Affordable Care Act is the mechanism
by which the health care initiative is funded and how the taxes and spending cuts affect
players in the market. There are many expenses that together make up the Affordable
Care Act's projected price tag. Cost estimates for the law range anywhere from $1-$2.6
trillion over the next decade depending on the group publishing the study, the timeframe, which factors were included, and how the analysis was done (Cost of Obamacare,
n.d.). It is also important to keep in mind that costs are constantly changing each year as
new data becomes available and new expenses arise. This section will examine how the
Affordable Care Act generates enough revenue to cover its approximately two trillion
dollar price tag and where that money eventually ends up.

The first and most noticeable expense comes from the tiered subsidies provided
by the federal government to low income families and those households making up to
four hundred percent of the poverty line. Additional costs include the expansion of
Medicaid and Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), both of which are programs
aimed at providing health insurance for the destitute and families with children . The final
major expenditure comes from tax credits and subsidies provided to small businesses that
provide their employees with health insurance (Cost of Obamacare, n.d.) . The costs of the
Affordable Care Act are explained here only for reference and to give the reader an idea
of where the money is going. The main focus of this section will be on the sources of
revenue that are used to fund these new government expenses. Although there are many
different sources of revenue for the Affordable Care Act, this paper will discuss a limited
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subset containing some of the more significant and interesting sources of funding. To see
the breakdown of revenue sources, please refer to figures 4 and 5 in the appendix.

Funding: The Hospital Insurance Payroll Tax

The aspect of the law that provides the largest source of revenue also happens to
be one of the most straightforward: an increase of the Hospital Insurance Payroll Tax,
more commonly referred to as the Medicare tax. Before the Affordable Care Act, any
employed individual would pay a 2.9% tax on all earned income that went into providing
funding for the Medicare program. The tax had a split legal incidence with the employer
paying 1.45% and the employee matching the other half (Medicare Tax, 2016). Since
1994, the Medicare Payroll Tax has applied to all wage income and lacked any sort of
ceiling.

The Affordable Care Act did not take steps to add a ceiling, but it did increase the
Hospital Insurance Tax by an additional 0.9% on employees that will apply to all income
over 200,000 dollars for a single individual or 250,000 for a married household (Social
Security, 2014). In addition to the increase in hospital insurance tax, there are also two
far less noticeable changes that will also have important effects. First, the additional tax
is not adjusted for inflation, and second, the tax now applies to not only wage income but
also investment income as well. Both of these changes have additional effects that go
beyond the simple 0.9% nominal increase.
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The fact that the tax is not indexed to inflation means that the tax will continue to
affect more and more individuals each year as inflation increases and additional citizens
find themselves in brackets that are subject to this additional tax . This means that the
effects of the new tax are not static, but rather dynamic and susceptible to additional
economic effects as time goes on.

The other factor mentioned that exacerbates the effects of the tax is the provision
that income investments are now subject to the additional tax . Before, an individual
would pay no Hospital Insurance Taxes on any form of investment income as the tax was
only a payroll tax. The new provision makes it so that all individuals with investment
income over the new 200,000/250,000 threshold will now pay an additional 3.8% tax
(2 .9% normal Hospital Insurance Tax plus additional 0.9% Affordable Care Act tax) on their
investment income . This means the 0.9% increase is actually about four times more
expensive on investment income than the nominal increase may imply. Both of these
factors should be kept in mind as they will amplify whatever effects the new tax has on
American citizens .

Moving onto the analysis of the tax itself shows several different effects. The
simplest level of analysis shows that this is a tax largely levied on high income earners as
anyone making less than the threshold will not see any direct loss of income. Since the
tax affects only high income earners and many of its funds go directly to the subsidization
of low income earners, there is a clear effect of redistribution of wealth. Whether this is
ethically correct is subjective and depends entirely on the perspectives and personal
values of an individual, and as such, the morality will not be discussed here.
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For the high income earners, upon which the extra burden would be placed, the
tax will likely lead to the typical array of economic effects that any tax usually creates.
One of the effects will be an additional deadweight loss that consumers of labor
(employers) and suppliers of labor (employees) will both lose out on . Although the legal
incidence of the new tax falls entirely on the suppliers of labor, classical economics shows
that the economic incidence of the tax will actually be divided across both parties, with
the incidence mainly determined by the slope or elasticity of the demand curve for labor
(Prante, 2006) . In this instance, employers lose out on some of the surplus from paying
employees less than their reservation wage and employees lose out as their true wage is
closer to their reservation wage than it was before.

This loss of satisfaction will also be accompanied by some level of cutback in the
supply of labor as a substitution effect makes leisure time more desirable for those
affected by the tax. It may even be fair to assume that because the tax only falls on high
income earners, the percentage decrease in labor supplied will be greater than a similar
tax on low income earners because wealthier individuals are more easily able to
substitute labor and leisure than a person living at or near the poverty level. The exact
reduction of the labor supplied as well as the exact loss of consumer and producer
surpluses are not as important as the understanding that these effects exist, and will have
an impact on the economy. To summarize, we can say that the additional Hospital
Insurance Tax will have a negative effect on consumer and producer surpluses, shrink the
labor supplied, and will have increasingly harmful effects over time as inflation makes
more individuals subject to the tax.
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Funding: The Individual Mandate Penalty

One of the other sources of revenue, quite ironically, comes from a penalty for
those who choose not to purchase health insurance. Any individual that is not enrolled in
a qualifying insurance program is set to face the larger of either a flat fee or a certain
percentage of his or her income. The additional tax is set to increase gradually each year
to provide an even larger incentive to purchase insurance (Obamacare Individual, n.d.).
The mechanism of the law that spells this out is known as the individual mandate and is
meant to incentivize individuals to purchase health coverage through a financial penalty.
While the individual mandate remains hotly contested in society, the effectiveness of
such a tax is pretty straightforward. The estimated income over the ten year period from
2013 - 2023 is roughly $55 billion (Kliff, 2012), which is no small amount in balancing the
spending from the Affordable Care act over that time period.

While this revenue source may hit expectations for the next decade, there seems
to be a serious flaw in the way this particular tax is designed. Simply put, the tax's
effectiveness is directly antagonistic to the effectiveness of the Affordable Care Act in
signing individuals up onto health care plans. As more and more people sign up for plans,
the costs of the Affordable Care Act increase, due to more subsidies being paid out, and
the revenue from this particular provision decreases, as fewer individuals are liable to pay
the individual mandate fee . The longer the Affordable Care Act remains in place, the more
expensive the overall program becomes, while the money flowing in to cover these
expenses shrinks, making the overall funding gap larger. Simply put, this is not a
sustainable tax for the purposes of properly funding the Affordable Care Act. As was the
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case with many issues addressed before, there are several philosophical objections that
arise with mandating health coverage, however, from a solely financial standpoint, the
individual mandate is not a proper long term funding mechanism for the Affordable Care
Act due to its decreasing effectiveness over time .

Funding: The Cuts to Medicare

Despite the myriad of taxes, including larger ones like those discussed above and
other smaller ones like a 10% tax on indoor tanning services (Obamacare's Funding, n.d.)
the federal government still was not able to receive enough funding to cover the large
expenditures under the new health care law. In order to close this funding gap, the law
enacted spending cuts in other areas so that the money could be redirected into the
Affordable Care Act. Approximately 741 billion dollars is appropriated through this
manner, with the vast majority of those cuts coming via a decline in Medicare funding
(Kliff, 2012). The direct effect of the decreased funding for the Medicare program is a
smaller Medicare budget, in which some areas must be cut in order for the program to
remain solvent. There are several mechanisms that Medicare can use to compensate for
this loss, but all of them negatively affect those insured by the program.

The first solution is that Medicare beneficiaries can simply pay more into the
system for the same care. This means that seniors will see increased costs through copayments, deductibles, and other out of pocket expenses for the same services. Through
this method, seniors are directly paying for the brunt of the funds that have been lost
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under the Affordable Care Act . The other way to cover this reduction is by reducing the
payouts that Medicare gives to physicians and hospitals for their services . On the surface
this seems like a zero-sum condition in which hospitals and doctors are the ones who now
face the loss from the Obamacare cuts rather than seniors, but this just is not the case. In
reality, the patients are the ones who suffer due to such an outcome through adverse
effects on their health.

Both Medicaid and Medicare already reimburse for medical treatment at pennies
on the dollar compared to private insurances, only paying about 50% and 80% of the costs
respectively. Pat Howry, an administrator at an otolaryngology clinic in Colorado, stated
that for a standard office visit the clinic would be reimbursed $119 for patients with
private insurance, $73 for patients with Medicare, and $53 for patients with Medicaid,
despite each patient receiving the same treatment . Because of this, the clinic began
limiting each doctor to no more than two Medicaid patients per day, a trend which is
becoming all too common as only about 46% of physicians accept Medicaid patients
(Tozzi, 2014).

The most serious result of the already low payment rates is that they create an
incentive for many health care providers to refuse to treat Medicaid and Medicare
patients, or even more common, to limit the number of patients with these insurances
that are treated . See Figure 6 in the appendix to see the increasing number of doctors
opting out of Medicare each year. The effects of decreasing Medicare reimbursements
below their already low levels would only serve to exacerbate this issue and reduce the
ability of Medicare patients to find a doctor of their choice or potentially any doctor at all
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in a timely manner. A combination of both decreasing reimbursements and forcing
Medicare patients to pay more out of pocket will be direct effects of the Affordable Care
Act's Medicare cuts. This funding source only serves to exacerbate the current issues
facing the health care system, and without adjustment will only worsen the situation as
expenses increase along with the aging population .
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Crony Capitalism in Political Legislation and the Affordable Care Act

As one would expect based on the negative results from the cuts to Medicare, the
senior citizen population overwhelmingly took issue with the reforms presented in the
Affordable Care Act. In fact, the oldest members of society were among one of the groups
with the most unfavorable opinions of the health care law (Roy, 2012). Surprisingly, the
American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), which represents the interests of the
majority of people enrolled in Medicare, actually endorsed the Affordable Care Act which
went against the desires and beliefs of their constituents . All of these pieces of
information lead to a fascinating question: "Why did the AARP go against the interests of
the people it represented and endorse the Affordable Care Act?" This example provides
an interesting case study of how incentives in businesses matter and why people and
organizations sometimes act in ways contrary to the best interests of those they
represent.

Although Medicare is funded heavily by the federal government through taxes
that all citizens pay in order to provide health care coverage to the elderly, there are still
costs that individuals on Medicare are forced to pay for the treatment they receive.
Oftentimes these costs can be rather high, encouraging seniors to purchase a product
known as gap insurance. Commonly referred to as Medigap, this private insurance is used
to pay for the additional costs that patients are still responsible for after Medicare has
paid its portion (Roy, 2012) . Interestingly enough, the AARP generates significant
revenues by selling its members gap insurance through a slew of private companies that
in turn give the AARP a hefty commission. This creates a very strong incentive for the
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AARP to not only ignore the issue of the Medicare gap, but also places the AARP in a
position where it would directly benefit from an increase in the gap.

The Affordable Care Act did not take any measures to improve the issues
surrounding Medigap insurance. This lack of action was incredibly beneficial to the AARP
because any measures to curtail the need for supplemental insurance would cost the
AARP billions in lost commissions. However, the funding scheme from the health care law
went further than just maintaining the status quo; it directly cut funds from Medicare
forcing patients to pick up additional costs that Medicare no longer covered. This
phenomenon acted as a driver of demand by encouraging more people to purchase
Medigap insurance.

As seniors sought to buy more supplemental insurance, the AARP would benefit
through the additional money it levied on commissions. Over the course of 10 years, with
an estimated commission of around 4.95%, the AARP is anticipated to gain $1 billion
through the increase in Medigap sales and avoid a $1.8 billion loss that would have been
realized had the AARP not lobbied against including gap reform measures in the health
care law (Roy, 2012) . These incentives provide a convincing explanation for why the AARP
was willing to go against the will of its members through its endorsement of the
Affordable Care Act.

At over 900 pages, the Affordable Care Act contains many examples of ways in
which palms were greased, deals were made, and special interests were appeased in
order to get the law passed . These examples are numerous in not just the Affordable Care
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Act, but also many other pieces of legislation and the examples could provide topics for
many more research papers . The important lesson to be learned is that crony capitalism
is a serious issue in American Society today and its prevalence was furthered through the
passage of the Affordable Care Act .

In order to have a properly functioning health care system, economy, and business
environment, the corruption and favor trading that exists must be absent from any future
bills . The Affordable Care Act failed to rise above the dishonesty that seems to be all too
common in politics, and instead perpetuated the defunct system by which American laws
are made. The passage of the law played a part in incentivizing the continuation of crony
capitalism by acting as one of the most noteworthy examples of the effectiveness of
dishonest politics.
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Conclusion:

We have now seen first-hand a sampling of the challenges that came along with
the passage and implementation of the Affordable Care Act. Although the law was able
to accomplish its goal of increasing access to health insurance for millions of people, it did
not address the serious issues of the American health care system that are leading to
ballooning costs and poor health outcomes. In order to accomplish the massive insurance
expansion, there were large redistributive effects that take revenue from high income
earners and healthy individuals in order to fund insurance for those who are less wealthy
and in poorer health. The law does this by banning insurance companies from charging
different prices for different patients and then requiring all Americans to purchase
insurance in order to subsidize the costs of the system. Whether this is right or wrong is
ultimately up to you, the reader, to decide, but the effects listed above are the simple
reality that Americans find themselves living in.

Regardless of redistributive effects, there are serious holes in the funding
mechanisms proposed under the Affordable Care Act. Taking from Medicare to pay for
Obamacare is a major disservice to the elderly and the deal was made in a corrupt manner
that went against the wishes of senior citizens . Perhaps most devastating of all are the
continually increasing costs of health care as the Affordable Care Act encourages and
subsidizes expensive and comprehensive plans that distort the demand for health care
services . The Affordable Care Act had the opportunity to address this issue, but instead
did the opposite and many Americans have now lost the low cost plans they once had. In
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the system we have today, health insurance is barely recognizable as any sort of true
insurance.

Working within the framework of the Affordable Care Act, there are simple
changes that could be made to increase health and reduce costs . By allowing insurance
companies to raise prices for individuals engaging in unhealthy behaviors, Americans
would be further incentivized to maintain a healthy lifestyle. By offering low cost plans
with high out of pocket expenses, Americans could reduce the number of unnecessary
procedures and keep more of their hard earned income. Finally, by shortening the openenrollment period and not exempting the majority of Americans from paying the
individual mandate tax, the few remaining loopholes for pseudo insurance could be
removed.

The analysis conducted in this paper simply scratches the surface of how the
Affordable Care Act has changed America. The complications discussed here are a minor
subset of the many problems surrounding the Affordable Care Act and hopefully provide
insight into some small steps that could slowly start to improve some of the issues facing
the American health care system. There are still many more matters to be discussed and
stories to be told involving the Affordable Care Act, but those will have to be saved for
another analysis. I sincerely hope this paper has been informative in summarizing some
of the major problems relating to insurance and the economics behind health care.

Ry a n

I 45

Works Cited

Blumberg, A., & Davidson, A. (2009, October 22). Accidents of History Created U.S. Health
System. Retrieved March 27, 2016, from
http://www. n pr.org/tem plates/story /story. php ?story Id= 114045132
Catastrophic Health Plans - Obamacare Facts . (n .d.). Retrieved April 11, 2016, from
http:// o ba m aca refa cts .com/health-ins u ran ce/catastro phi c-pla n s/
CMS' Program History. (2015, April 9). Retrieved March 27, 2016, from
https://www.cms .gov/About-CMS/ AgencyInformation/H istory/index. htm I?red i rect=/H istory /
Cutler, D. M., & Zeckhauser, R. J. (2000). The anatomy of health insurance . Handbook of
health economics, 1, 563-643.

Cochrane, J. H. (2013). After the ACA: Freeing the market for health care. Available at
SSRN 2213027.

Cost of ObamaCare. (n.d.). Retrieved April 09, 2016, from
http ://oba mac a refacts.com/costof-oba mac a re/
Healthcare Collection Statistics. (n.d.). Retrieved April 11, 2016, from
http://www.aca i nte rnati ona I.org/p rod ucts-hea Ith ca re-collection-statistics5434 .as px
Henderson, D (2008). "Demand." The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics. Library of
Economics and Liberty. Retrieved April 11, 2016 from the World Wide Web:
http://www.econ Ii b.org/I i bra ry /Enc/Demand. htm I
Fosmire, S. (2009, October 10). FAQ on EMT ALA. Retrieved April 07, 2016, from
http://www.emtala.com/faq .htm
How Health Insurance Marketplace Plans Set Your Premiums. (n .d.). Retrieved March 31,
2016, from https://www.healthcare.gov/how-pla ns-set-your-premiums/
Klein, P. (2014, July 04). How much does Obamacare actually cost? Retrieved April 09,
2016, from http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/how-much-doe s-obamacareactually-cost/article/2546895
Kliff, S. (2012, August 30) . How Congress paid for Obamacare (in two charts) . Retrieved
April 10, 2016, from
https://www. wash i ngtonpost.com/news/won k/wp/2012/08/30/how-congresspaid-for-oba m aca re-in-two-charts/

Ry a n

I 46

Medicare Tax and You - Fidelity. (2016, February 03) . Retrieved April 09, 2016, from
https ://www .fid el ity.com/viewpoi nts/persona I-fi n a nee/new-med icare-taxes
Murray, C. (n.d.). The vast majority of American adults are overweight or obese, and
weight is a growing problem among US children. Retrieved March 31, 2016, from
http://www .hea Ith data .org/news-release/vast-majority-a merica n-ad ults-a reoverweight-or-obese-a nd-weight-growi ng-problem-a mong
Norris, L. (2016, March 04) . What are the ACA's enrollment periods and when can I enroll
outside of the open enrollment period? Retrieved April 08, 2016, from
https ://www .hea Ith i nsu ra nce.org/faqs/what-a re-the-acas-en rol Iment-periodsa nd-when-ca n-i-en rol I-outside-of-the-open-en rol Iment-period/
ObamaCare Individual Mandate . (n .d.). Retrieved April 07 , 2016, from
http ://oba mac a refacts .com/oba mac a re-indiv id ua I-mandate/
ObamaCare Pre-exisiting Conditions. (n.d .). Retrieved March 31 , 2016, from
http://obamacarefacts.com/pre-existing -conditions/
ObamaCare Summary: Obama Health Care Summary. (n.d.). Retrieved March 27, 2016,
from http://obamacarefacts.com/obamahea lthca re-summary/
Obamacare's Funding : Where the money comes from and where it goes?

I Align

America . (n.d .). Retrieved April 10, 2016, from
http://www.a Iigna merica .com/node/62
Potter, W. (2015 , August 19 ). Why pre-existing conditions mattered to millions . Retrieved
March 27 , 2016, from https://www.healthinsurance.org/blog/2015/08/19/w hypre-existi ng-conditions-mattered-to-m i 11 ions/
Prante, G., & Chamberlain , A (2006, June 09). Economic vs. Legal Incidence : Comparing
Census Bureau Figures with Tax Foundation Ta x Burdens. Retrieved April 09,
2016, from http ://ta xfoundation.org/a rticle/economic-vs-lega 1-i ncidence com pa ring-census-bu rea u-fi gu res-ta x-fa u ndati on-ta x-burdens
Preventable Deaths from Heart Disease & Stroke . (2013) . Retrieved March 31 , 2016, from
http://www.cd c. gov/vita lsigns/hea rtd isease-stroke/
Roy, A. (2012, September 22). How the AARP Made $2.8 Billion By Supporting
Obamacare's Cuts to Medicare. Retrieved April 10, 2016, from
http://www .forbes .com/sites/a ray /2012/09/22/the-aa rps-2-8-bi Ilion-reasons-forsu pporti ng-oba mac a res-cuts-to-med ica re/tt7 la6e69643 53
Social Security and Medicare Ta xable Wage Limits and Rates. (2014, November 04) .
Retrieved April 09 , 2016, from http://www .adp .com/tools-and-resources/adp-

Ry

an

I 47

re sea rch-i nstitute/i nsights/i nsight-item-deta i I.aspx ?id={2 DA 70D0E-AS DF-4C7 3BEC9-9F FAB890CE EE}
Sun, L. (2016, March 30). They're sicker, plus ACA enrollees cost more in care, major
insurer finds. Retrieved March 31, 2016, from
https ://www. wash i ngton post.com/news/to-you r-hea lth/wp/2 016/03/30/theyresicker-pl us-a ca-enrollees-cost-more-in-ca re-major-i nsu rer-fi nds/
The Healthcare Costs of Obesity. (n.d.). Retrieved March 31, 2016, from
http:// stateofo bes ity. o rg/h ea Ith care-costs-obesity/
Tozzi, J. (2014, April 10). Losing Patience, and Patients, With Medicaid. Retrieved April 10,
2016, from http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-04-10/doctors-shunpati e nts-who-pay-with-med i ca id
What Are Health Insurance Provider Discounts, and How Do They Save Plan Members
Money? WPS Health Insurance, a Leading Provider of Individual Health Insurance,
Explains. (2012, May 23). Retrieved April 10, 2016, from
http://www.wpsic.com/news/2012-0523-healthplansavingmoney.shtml#.VwrE8kc4Evw

Ryan 148

Appendix

Figure 1:
Graphic showing a real increase in health care spending per person from 1980-2009.

Growth in National Health Spending per C pita and the
Consumer Price Index {Urban) (1980 = 100)
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Figure 2:
Graphic showing a large increase in health care expenditures per person for both private
insurance and Medicare enrolled patients from 1969-2009.
Private health insurance expenditure per enrollee has grown
61% more than that of Medicare since 1969
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Figure 3:
Graphic showing the rapid real increases in premium prices each year after inflation.
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Figure 4:
Graphic indicating where spending cuts are being made to funnel money into the
Affordable Care Act. Note that the majority of cuts are to Medicare.
Affordable Care Act Spending Cuts. 2013-2022
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Figure 5:
Graphic detailing the new revenue sources and taxes needed to fund the Affordable
Care Act and the health insurance exchanges.
Affordable Call!! Ad Revenue Increases. 2013-2022
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Figure 6:
Graphic demonstrating a rapidly increasing number of providers choosing to opt out of
Medicare each year.
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